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Abstract— The increasing popularity of social networks, such
as Facebook and Orkut, has raised several privacy concerns.
Traditional ways of safeguarding privacy of personal information
by hiding sensitive attributes are no longer adequate. Research
shows that probabilistic classification techniques can effectively
infer such private information. The disclosed sensitive information of friends, group affiliations and even participation in activities, such as tagging and commenting, are considered background
knowledge in this process. In this paper, we present a privacy
protection tool, called Privometer, that measures the amount of
sensitive information leakage in a user profile and suggests selfsanitization actions to regulate the amount of leakage. In contrast
to previous research, where inference techniques use publicly
available profile information, we consider an augmented model
where a potentially malicious application installed in the user’s
friend profiles can access substantially more information. In our
model, merely hiding the sensitive information is not sufficient
to protect the user privacy. We present an implementation of
Privometer in Facebook.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Online social networks have paved the way for people
to stay connected with their friends, mingle with others
having similar interests, and share personal information and
experiences. To address privacy concerns, users can use privacy settings and hide sensitive information. However, it has
been shown [1][2] that such measures are not sufficient to
protect one’s privacy due to the friendship relations, group
memberships, or even participating in activities like photo
tagging and commenting, which can be harvested through
‘screen-scraping’ [3] or other means. Social ties represented
as network data can be exploited by the adversary to predict
the value of the sensitive attributes through a wide array of
network classification techniques [4], [5].
To promote different aspects of usage, social network
platforms are now allowing independent developers to build
applications on their platforms, e.g., Facebook API and Orkut
OpenSocial API developer platforms. Through these APIs,
third party applications have now access to personal information that they may not even need. In May 2008, the technology
program ‘Click’ on BBC [6] demonstrated how a malicious
application masquerading as a harmless application harvested
personal data without the user even knowing about it. A
study by Felt et. al. [7] shows that 90.7% of applications are
being given more privileges than they need. Clearly, malicious
applications can have access to more information than the
information simply obtained by ‘screen-scraping’. Moreover,
such malicious applications can more effectively infer sensitive
information from profiles of users who did not even install
them in their profiles.

Fig. 1: Privometer on Facebook

To address privacy concerns in social networks including
the case where a potentially malicious application is installed
in the profiles of the user’s friends, we present Privometer1
(Fig. 1), a novel privacy protection tool for social networks that
can (i) measure the amount of sensitive information leakage
based on the relationship information and private information
of the user’s friends and (ii) offer users a unique feature
to regulate this leakage through a suggested list of actions
referred to as self-sanitization actions.

(a) Information Visibility in
User Profile

(b) Adversary Model with Malicious
Application

Fig. 2: User’s Privacy Control and Adversary Model
Privometer, installed in a user profile (v0 ), can access private
information from the friend profiles that are made available
to friends only (Fig. 2a). However, a malicious application
installed in a friend’s profile may try to infer the user’s private
information that is not revealed to anyone including the user’s
friends. In Fig. 2b user v0 is shown to have five friends
{v1 , ..., v5 } having various amount of private and public infor1 Privometer

can be accessed at http://apps.facebook.com/privometer.

mation in their profiles. The users v3 , v4 and v5 have installed
an application M . M has access to all private information of
users v3 , v4 and v5 , even though they have not made it publicly
available. v0 has not added M to her profile; yet, her private
information can be more accurately inferred by M due to this
additional knowledge. Privometer assumes that the malicious
application runs an inference algorithm in the background
using known inferences models. Since Privometer is unaware
of the inference model the adversary might use, it considers
a list of the best known models [2] and determines sensitive
information leakage using any of these models. Then it selects
the model which most accurately infers the user’s sensitive
attributes; in other words, the model that causes the most
damage to the user in terms of leakage. Finally, based on the
combined probability of sensitive attribute inference using the
best chosen model, Privometer presents to the user a measure
of her privacy, a ranking of her friends based on individual
contributions to privacy leakage, and self-sanitization actions
to lessen this leakage.
Previous work on sensitive attribute inference [1][2][8] use
publicly available data only. Due to the lack of sensitive information availability in public profiles, researchers took resort
to applying learning methods on synthetic data. He et. al. [1]
considered a hypothetical attribute and assumed homogeneous
Conditional Probability Table (CPT) for immediate friends of
a user in a Bayesian Network Structure. In the network, a
friend is considered a child node of the user (parent node). The
assignment of a node’s value is made based on parent’s value
and node’s assigned probability conditioned on parent’s value.
Since our work considers a malicious platform application as
adversary and the augmented model, the adversary obtains
additional knowledge of some users’ sensitive information
(obtained through the social network platform API) in addition
to their public profile information. Through this data collection
approach we can build real-world data set and avoid generating
synthetic data. Felt et. al. [7] proposed a data hiding scheme
for third party developers to be implemented by the social network platform called privacy-by-proxy to preserve anonymity
of user data. However, this approach have not been considered
by any platform due to the potential negative influence on the
social network’s growth and performance.
Our contributions in this paper are:
• To the best of our knowledge, Privometer is the first
functional prototype of a privacy measuring tool to be
implemented on a social network platform.
• We provide a realistic insight to the sensitive attribute inference problem by considering applications installed on
the user’s friend profiles as a potential adversary that can
access more than publicly available profile information.
• We introduce the notion of self-sanitization to provide
users with control over information leakage from their
profiles.

Rank, and Self-Sanitization. The Inference model determines
the probability of individual sensitive attribute inference in
a user profile based on her friendship relations and friends’
attribute values. The information leakage is represented as
a combined probability of inference, and the best inference
model is chosen based on the maximum leakage value. The
Friends Rank component finds the amount of match of sensitive attribute values between the user and friends. The friends
are then ranked based on this matching. The self-sanitization
component considers that a high ranked friend would cause
more leakage than a low ranked friend. It suggests to the user
a list of actions to ‘sanitize’ (lessen) the information leakage
in their profiles.

Fig. 3: Basic Framework for Privometer
We developed Privometer as a Facebook platform application using Facebook PHP Client API to fetch information
from user profiles. Privometer has two different modes of
operation, namely, ‘online’ and ‘offline’. For performance
reasons, the ‘online’ mode takes into consideration only partial
friendship relations to limit computation. In ‘online’ mode, the
inference is performed based on the most frequently occurring
attribute value in friends’ profiles (Fig. 4). The ‘offline’ mode
requires the user to allow Privometer to collect information
even when the user is not logged in. The training is performed
on this data with various classification techniques. The current
implementation considers only neighbor relations (immediate
friends) and uses the ‘network-only Bayes classifier’ [9] to
measure the probability of inference (or information leakage)
due to friendship links. In this paper, we do not consider profile
information beyond immediate friends. The self-sanitization
recommendations take into account how much individual
influence the friends have on the leakage of user’s sensitive
attributes. An example of self-sanitization action is to ask a
friend to totally hide the matched sensitive attribute. When
the user logs in, the measure of information leakage and selfsanitization recommendations are ready for her to view.

II. P RIVOMETER F RAMEWORK
We show the basic Privometer framework in Fig. 3. The basic building blocks of Privometer are Inference Model, Friends

Fig. 4: Inference by Friendship Relations

III. I NFERENCE M ODEL
We represent the friendship relations of a Privometer user
as star graph2 as shown in Fig. 2b. We call it a friendship
link graph, denoted by G = (V, E). In the graph, v0 ∈ V is
connected to every other nodes in the graph. An edge ej ∈ E
represents that vj is a friend of v0 ’s. From Fig. 2a, Privometer,
which is installed on v0 ’s profile, has access to vi ’s attributes
that are either public or made available to friends only. The
sensitive attributes can take on a set of possible values; for
example, attribute ak can take values from a finite set Ak =
{αk1 , ...αkl }.
We consider, a malicious application has access to all
these attribute values except for Alice’s ones (shown as bold
periphery in Alice’s case). Alice, Becky, Carol and Emma
have the same value for ‘gender’, and Alice, Becky, David
and Fred have the same value for ‘political view’. So, even
though Alice did not disclose any of the attributes, it is possible
for the malicious application to accurately infer the sensitive
attributes from her friendship links.
The information leakage is represented as a combined
probability of sensitive attribute inference from the information available in immediate friends’ profiles. Fig. 4 shows
an example of inference by looking at the most frequent
attribute values in friends’ profiles. Privometer determines the
probability of individual attribute inference first. Then, based
on these values and relative sensitivity of attributes, it obtains
the combined probability (described later in the section). In
Fig. 4, let us consider that the attribute ‘political view’ is
more sensitive than ‘gender’ and both of them happen to be
private in Alice’s profile. In that case, David would cause more
sensitive information leakage than Carol for Alice.
In the inference model, the sensitive attribute ak of v0 is
considered a random variable v0 .a˜k . G captures the friendship
relations, and hence the inference is conditioned on G. For a
general probabilistic inference model Υ, v0 ’s inferred attribute:
v0 .ãk = argαkt max PΥ (v0 .ak = αkt |G)
In the Privometer prototype, we implemented the networkonly Bayes Classifier inference model (nBC) described by
Chakrabarti et. al.[9]. Any other inference model can be easily
added to Privometer in a plug and play fashion. Since, the
value for v0 .a˜k is dependent on vi .ak ’s distribution, where
i 6= 0, the probability of inference for v0 .a˜k in this model is:
PnBC (v0 .a˜k = αkt |N0 ) =
=

P (N0 |v0 .a˜k =αkt ).P (v0 .a˜k =αkt )
P (N0 )

P (N0 |v0 .a˜k =αkt ).P (αkt )
P (N0 )

where, 1 < t < |Ak |

Let us consider that vi .ak ’s are the sensitive attribute value
observed at vi ’s. N0 represents the collection of all known
attribute values for ak of all v0 ’s friends, i.e. vi .ak ’s, i 6= 0.
Since, vi .ak ’s are independent of each other, we can assume
conditional independence for the term P (N0 |v0 .a˜k = αkt )
and further reduce it.
Q|N |
P (N0 |v0 .a˜k = αkt ) = Z1 i=10 P (vi .ak |v0 .a˜k = αkt )
2 Facebook

platform API is limited to immediate friends’ information only

Here, Z is the normalization constant. P (N0 ) is the same
for all possible vi .ak values, and hence considered constant
[4][9]. We do not need to compute P (N0 ) explicitly since
we are normalizing P (N0 |v0 .a˜k ) with Z. The nodes’ prior
probability, P (αkt ), is simply the frequency distribution of
vi ’s for all ak values (without considering any relations). The
term, P (vi .ak |v0 .a˜k = αkt ) (called the ‘Influence Strength’
in He et. al.’s work [1]) describes how v0 influences its friend
vi , i 6= 0 on attribute ak . The higher the value is, the higher
the probability that v0 and vi , i 6= 0 will have the same value
for attribute ak .
Privometer determines the inference probabilities of all sensitive attributes using known inference models (e.g., relational
and collective classifiers [2]). For a model Υ, the inferred
attributes are {v0 .a˜k , 1 ≤ k ≤ q}. Privometer records the
success and failure of the inferred attributes as a vector, called
attribute matching vector, ψ̃ for model Υ. The k-th component,
ψ̃ (k) denotes the success or failure of inference for ak :

1
if v0 .ãk = v0 .ak
(k)
ψ̃Υ =
0
otherwise
The combined probability of inference for model Υ is then:
Pq
(k)
SΥ = k=0 ω (k) ℘Υ ψ̃Υ
where ℘Υ = maxi P (v0 .ãk = αkt |G) , ω (k) is the relative
sensitivity
for attributes ak , ω (k) = [0, 1], 1 ≤ k ≤ q,
Pq vector
(k)
and
= 1. And, SΥ = [0, 1] (is normalized by ω).
k=0 ω
Privometer picks the best inference model based on the
maximum combined probability of inference: S˜Υ = maxSΥ .
Self-sanitization recommendations are then provided based on
this best chosen inference model.
IV. S ELF - SANITIZATION R ECOMMENDATIONS
Privometer offers suggestions for effectively controlling the
amount of sensitive information leaked from a user profile due
to friendship relations. Since the actions to sanitize (lower)
the leakage in the user profile are offered as a choice to the
user, we call them self-sanitization recommendations. This
provides an additional protection that is complementary to
user privacy settings. As we mentioned earlier, merely hiding
sensitive attributes through privacy settings is not sufficient
to protect privacy from malicious applications installed in
friends’ profiles. For example, in Fig. 2a, even if user vi has
not made a4 and a5 publicly available, they can be used by
M to infer v0 ’s a4 and a5 .
i
We denote S̃Υ
as v0 ’s friend vi ’s individual contribution
(i 6= 0) to sensitive attribute inference in the best chosen
inference model Υ. We also represent ψi as vi ’s matching
vector that records the matches between v0 and vi ’s attributes.
Privometer determines vi ’s
contributions to inforPindividual
(k)
q
i
mation leakage as: S̃Υ
= k=0 ω (k) ψi ψ̃ (k) .
Pq
(k) (k) (k)
i
ψi ψ̃
The weighted version is: S̃Υ
= P|N10 |
k=0 γi ω
γ
i
i=1
where, γi is the weight of the link between v0 and vi , i 6= 0.
The weights can be the number of wall posts exchanged,
number of photos tagged, number of mutual friends, etc.

(a) Leakage-based Tag Cloud of Friends

(b) Sanitization Recommendations

Fig. 5: Privometer Friends Rank and Sanitization page

Privometer ranks friends based on individual contributions
to information leakage. From the amount of match, Privometer
provides the user with a list of actions to help bring down the
information leakage. Privometer can also show how the combined probability will be affected if a specific recommendation
action is carried out by the user and her friends. An example
of self-sanitization actions is requesting a friend to totally hide
a sensitive attribute from his profile.
V. I MPLEMENTATION OF P RIVOMETER
We consider a use case scenario where ‘sex’ and ‘political
view’ are the user’s sensitive attributes. Privometer reading
in Fig. 1 shows the amount of combined leakage found for
these two attributes from the available attribute values of
the friends. We consider ‘political view’ (weight 0.7) to be
more sensitive than ’sex’ (0.3). We classify ‘political view’
as ‘liberal’, ‘conservative’ and ‘other’ based on simple string
matching. ‘sex’ is categorized to ‘male’, ‘female’ and ‘none’
(not specified). The Friends Rank page (Fig. 5a) shows a list
of friends in a ‘Tag Cloud’ visual representation. The relative
size of the fonts denotes the relative amount of leakage caused
by the friends. Selecting one of the friends from the cloud will
take the user to the sanitization action page for a specific friend
(Fig. 5b). In this page, the action - ‘requesting the friend to
hide the matched sensitive attribute from public’ is suggested.
The Privometer reading shown in this page represents the new
amount of leakage if the sanitization action is performed by
the user’s friend. It is also possible to check the changes in
privacy meter reading if a number of friends with the same
matches carries out the sanitization action.
VI. C ONCLUSIONS AND F UTURE D IRECTIONS
In this paper, we described Privometer, a tool that measures
privacy leakage in social networks including information obtained by malicious applications installed in the user’s friend
profiles. Privometer ranks friends based on their individual
contributions to privacy leakage and suggest self-sanitization
to lessen this leakage accordingly.
The work presented in this paper is only the start for a novel
and practical approach to inform users about their privacy in

social networks and help them protect it. There are several
possible extensions: Privometer is currently assumed to be
installed on a single user profile, restricting available information to immediate friends only. If Privometer is installed on
some or all the user’s friends, we could have access to more
information and apply collective classification techniques [10]
for more sensitive attribute inference. Furthermore, while
implementing Privometer, we only considered friendship links
for sensitive attribute inference. To achieve a more accurate
inference, we plan to extend the data model to consider group
affiliations, page subscriptions, tagging activities, and so on.
We could also weight the links in the data model with more
information like the number of messages exchanged, mutual
friendships, and similar tastes, to denote strong and weak
relationships for inference. Finally, self-sanitization actions
can be more diverse to include for example unsubscribing from
group affiliations, removing applications, and not engaging in
some specific activities (e.g., photo tagging) in social network.
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